We test the hypothesis that a conservative leverage policy directed at maintaining financial flexibility can enhance investment ability. Our analysis reveals that, following a period of low leverage, firms are able to make more capital expenditures and increase abnormal investment. The impact of the flexibility status is both statistically significant and economically sizeable. The new investments are financed through new issues of debt, which take companies closer to their predicted target leverage. Our results are consistent with the view that firms tend to respond to financial constraints by decreasing their leverage and so provide a rationale for debt conservativism.
Recent survey evidence suggests that financial flexibility is what primarily drives chief finance officers' leverage choices. Respondents say that flexibility is very important in enabling them to undertake investment in the future, when asymmetric information and contracting problems might otherwise force firms to forego profitable growth opportunities (Bancel and Mitoo, 2004; Brounen et al., 2004; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Pinegar and Wilbricht, 1989) .
According to arguments made by Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Myers (1984) , capital market imperfections make it necessary for firms to preserve flexibility, implying "the maintenance by firms of a substantial reserve of untapped borrowing power" (Modigliani and Miller, 1963, pg 442) . In his seminal paper, Myers (1977) shows how a firm's debt overhang may induce it to forego profitable investment opportunities, even when managers' interests are fully aligned with shareholders' interests.
However, still little is known about how to "measure" financial flexibility and how it actually enhances investment ability. In this paper we tackle these two important issues. We test the hypothesis that following a period of conservative leverage, firms attain a degree of financial flexibility that enables them to make significantly larger capital expenditures. We provide compelling evidence that, after being classified as financially flexible, companies have enhanced investment ability. The result is economically significant, as by following this strategy an average company is able to increase its capital expenditures by around 50 percent.
More importantly, in our tests we detect a significant increase in flexible firms' abnormal investment. This provides strong evidence that companies sacrifice borrowing today to enhance their ability to seize better growth opportunities in the future. Moreover, our results lend strong support to the view that these companies finance new investments by means of positive net debt issues that take them closer to their estimated target leverage.
In the first step of our analysis, we identify "financially flexible" (FF) firms by focusing on low-leverage (LL) firms. We estimate a leverage equation from which we calculate the predicted level of debt. Low-leverage firms are defined as those that are below the estimated target. We then classify a firm as FF if it shows a low-leverage policy for a minimum number of consecutive years. This ensures that we are, indeed, observing a policy rather than just a transitory shock to the capital structure of the firm.
In the second step of our study, we test whether this degree of financial flexibility has any impact on investment ability. The prediction is that in the presence of market frictions, firms that anticipate valuable growth options in the future may respond by pursuing a policy of low leverage for a number of years. In this way, FF firms have enough spare borrowing power to be able to raise external funds and invest more in the years following the conservative financial policy. To test this hypothesis, we specify a q-model of investment augmented by our FF dummy. According to our flexibility argument, the FF dummy should have a positive and significant impact on capital expenditures. Additionally, to the extent that FF firms can, after a period of low leverage, more easily raise external funds to finance their projects, their investment ability should be less dependent on internal funds. As a consequence, we would expect a negative sensitivity of investment to cash flow parameter.
To further investigate this hypothesis, we undertake an analysis of firm behaviour over time before and after the flexibility status is acquired. If our prediction is correct, then we would expect to detect the following: 1) firms show lower investments during the conservative leverage period and increase their investments around time t when they are classified as FF; 2) to the extent that the price for this flexibility is substituting investment today with investment tomorrow, FF firms should also show an increase in their abnormal investments; 3) FF firms should show a sharp increase in leverage at time t and, accordingly, an increase in net debt issues as they are expected to finance these new investments with debt.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it differs from previous investment literature, as we investigate explicitly the impact of a distinct leverage policy on the investment ability of firms. To the best of our knowledge, Lang et al. (1996) and, very recently, Aivazian et al. (2005a Aivazian et al. ( , 2005b include debt variables in their investment models. However, their analyses focus on how the current level of external financing influences investment decisions. They do not take into account the presence of target capital structures. In particular, we argue that the way in which the level of external debt influences a company's ability to invest may differ depending on whether the company is below or above its target leverage.
Furthermore, we classify firms on the basis of their degree of financial flexibility; while previous investment studies have typically focused on criteria based on the companies' financial constraints (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988; Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Hoshy et al., 1991) .
Second, only a limited number of papers have studied debt conservativism. Graham (2000) and Minton and Wruck (2001) observe that conservative firms stockpile financial slack or debt capacity in order to finance future discretionary expenditures. However, the focus of these studies is very different from ours. Graham (2000) estimates the magnitude of the tax benefits of debt. Minton and Wruck (2001) investigate the determinants of financial conservatism behaviour. In contrast, our work explicitly analyzes the impact of a financial strategy on investment by including the leverage policy status in the investment model. In this way, our work provides a rationale for debt conservativism that tallies with the theoretical predictions recently proposed by Almeida et al. (2006) . Third, in defining low-leverage firms, we adopt a methodology different from that in previous studies. Graham (2000) infers how aggressively a firm uses debt by observing where it locates on its interest benefit function; Minton and Wruck (2001) classify a firm as being lowleverage if its value is in the bottom 20 percent of all firms for five consecutive years. In contrast, we estimate the amount of leverage as predicted by the dominant capital structure theories. We then control how firms deviate from it in order to identify the low-leverage firms. One advantage of our approach is that, by estimating a leverage model, we consider a number of firm-specific characteristics that are likely to affect company debt, and consequently, the investment strategy.
A further distinguishing feature of our work is that by calculating the predicted leverage for firms, we control for the problem of managerial entrenchment and the influence of agency conflicts inside the firm. To this end, we hand-collect detailed information on ownership by directors and external shareholders and on board composition, on an annual basis for a sample of 1,100 UK non-financial firms listed between 1991 and 2001. Study of the UK environment is important as it provides out-of-sample evidence that complements existing U.S. studies.
Also, as the LSE is becoming the largest stock market in the world (New York Times, 2006), study of UK firms is of growing importance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I develops the hypotheses tested in this analysis. We describe the data in Section II. We present the empirical results in Section III, and discuss our conclusions in Section IV.
I. Research Design

A. Definition of Low-Leverage Firms
In the first step of the analysis, we identify leverage-conservative firms that we use instrumentally to define financially flexible firms. We use a partial adjustment model that includes a set of variables widely accepted in the literature as potential determinants of leverage, to capture the targeting behaviour of firms. The estimated model provides us with the fitted value for debt, which represents what financial theory would predict the level of leverage of each company to be.
Since there are no well-defined measures in literature to proxy for flexibility, it is difficult to control for it in conventional leverage models. For this reason, we propose to indirectly capture financial flexibility using the deviations from predicted target leverage. We compare the estimated (fitted) values with the actual values and define LL firms as those that have a negative deviation between the actual and the predicted level of leverage. We will refer to this as the target methodology. For robustness purposes, we also utilize a more stringent definition, according to which firms are classified as LL only if their negative deviation from the target is larger (in absolute terms) than at least 25 percent of all LL firms.
An alternative would be to set a benchmark value that separates low leverage from high leverage based on the statistical distribution (we will refer to this as the percentile methodology). For example, Minton and Wruck (2001) classify firms as low leverage when their debt ratio is in the bottom 20 percent of the distribution. The former technique is preferred for a number of reasons. First, it is reasonable to believe that the amount of debt in a firm depends on a series of firm-specific characteristics.
Indeed, a preliminary inspection of the data reveals significant differences in total debt across different industries.
Second, an increasing number of studies corroborate the idea that firms do, indeed, have a target capital structure. According to the figures reported in Graham and Harvey (2001) , 37 percent of U.S. firms have a flexible target debt ratio, while a further 35 percent have a stricter target. Brounen et al. (2004) reported similar figures for the UK. In a recent paper, Flannery and Rangan (2006) provided strong evidence of targeting behavior, which substantiates these survey results.
Further, this approach seems more appropriate to assess the evolution of debt changes over time. For example, inspection of the data shows how the company Bett Brothers records a leverage of around 0.0137 percent in 1997, and 4.22 percent in 1998, which corresponds approximately to a 309 percent increase in debt ratio. These two values belong to the first and second deciles of the distribution, respectively. Therefore, despite the considerable increase in leverage, this firm would still be classified as LL if we used a fixed benchmark. On the other hand, using the target approach, we find that while the 1997 observation corresponds to a negative deviation from the target (i.e., LL status), the firm is over the estimated target in 1998, and therefore loses LL status.
This approach is not free from drawbacks, however. The most serious potential shortcoming lies in the fact that the choice of the leverage model affects the estimated target and deviation from it. This, in turn, would influence the classification of firms and the subsequent investment results. To minimize the possibility that the results are driven by the choice of a specific leverage model, we test the robustness of our hypotheses using several 1 Mikkelson and Partch (2003) classify as "high cash" those companies that hold more than 25% of their assets in cash and equivalents. See also Iona et al. (2004) for the UK firms.
widely accepted leverage models. The base specification (Specification 1) is the seminal Rajan and Zingales (1995) four variables model: growth opportunities, defined as the ratio of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of total assets (Mtbv); size, as the natural logarithm of total assets (Size); tangible assets, as the ratio of total fixed assets to total assets (Collateral); and profitability, measured as the ratio of the earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation to total assets (Profitability).
In a second test (Specification 2), we augment the Rajan and Zingales regression with ownership control variables, under the hypothesis that agency conflicts between managers and shareholders may be important determinants of leverage choices (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Harris and Raviv, 1990; Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990) . We include executive ownership, defined as the total percentage of shares outstanding held by executive directors (Managerial Ownership); blockholding, measured as the total proportion of stock held in block positions by all non-managerial owners, where a block position is more than 3 percent of shares (Blockholding); and the proportion of non-executives on the board (Board Composition).
In a third specification, we include other control variables to take into account the financial status of firms (Specification 3). This is important as firms may attain a degree of financial flexibility through means other than conservative leverage, such as accumulating cash reserves (e.g., Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Marchica and Mura, 2007) , defined as the ratio of total cash and equivalents to total assets (Cash); shortening debt maturity (e.g., Myers, 1977; Childs et al., 2006) , measured as the ratio of total loans repayable after one year to total debt (Maturity); or lowering dividend payments (Jagannathan et al., 2000) , proxied by the ratio of ordinary dividends minus the Advance Corporation Tax to total assets (Dividends).
B. Estimation methodology: Leverage
We estimate all leverage models using the GMM-SYS methodology, which allows us to control for a number of econometric issues simultaneously. First, it enables us to address the issue of endogeneity of regressors. This arises because shocks that affect corporate gearing are also likely to affect other regressors. For instance, it may be argued that leverage decisions affect the company's cash holding or dividend policy, rather than the other way around (cross causality). A further reason for endogeneity arises from the possibility that firm-specific characteristics (fixed effects) may be correlated with the explanatory variables.
2 As a consequence, in this work we estimate the following model:
2 Diagnostic tests confirm that firm fixed effects are important in explaining leverage ratios. Another concern arises when there is a high degree of persistence in the data. 4 Under such conditions, Arellano and Bover (1995) propose an estimator that considers the equation in levels, with both lagged first-differenced and lagged level terms as instruments in the firstdifference equation. Blundell and Bond (1998) examine this procedure in detail, illustrating significant asymptotic efficiency gains in this GMM-SYS estimator. They also emphasize that, when weak instruments are present, the finite sample bias of the GMM-DIFF is likely to be in the direction of the WG estimator. In light of these issues, we use the GMM-SYS technique for this analysis.
C. Definition of Financially Flexible firms
To classify FF firms, we adopt the following criterion: the dummy takes the value of 1 when we observe at least three consecutive periods in which the firm is classified as LL prior to the investment decision (FF and FFpct) . 5 For clarity, we present a step-by-step description of the method followed to classify firms using the FF dummy in Table I . The first observation 3 By construction, the process of taking first differences introduces serial correlation of order one. 4 Analysis of persistency in the data similar to Bond (2002) reveals that most autoregressive coefficients are in the region of 0.8. 5 FF refers to LL firms classified using the "simple" deviation criterion, while FFpct refers to firms being classified as LL if the deviation is larger than 25% of other LL firms. We also perform robustness tests in which we only require 2 consecutive periods of LL to classify a firm as FF. Results are virtually unaltered.
in the series is not available because the data are first differenced to run the leverage models.
Further, we require a minimum of three consecutive observations in which firms are classified as low leverage (LL) to assign the financially flexible (FF) status. Therefore, the first employable observation to classify FF companies is the fourth one (corresponding to the 1995 observation in the example). As a consequence, the observations for 1992, 1993, and 1994 are also marked as "N/A". 6 It is worth underlining that, by defining the dummy in this way in the investment model, we investigate the relation between investment at time t (IK it ) and the dummy FF, which defines a past behaviour (i.e. leverage conservativism between t-3 and t-1).
In other words, this allows us to test if past acquired financial flexibility influences current investment ability. This should address the concern that the FF dummy (and consequently leverage) is endogenous to investment.
[INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE]
We report the descriptive classification of firms in Table II 
D. Investment model hypotheses
In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller (1963) noted that, despite the existence of some tax advantages for debt financing, firms tend not "to use the maximum possible amount of debt in their capital structure" because of limitations from lenders, which lead to "the need for preserving flexibility." In the modified version of the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) , even if they cover part of normal investment with new borrowing, firms have two main reasons to restrain themselves from issuing debt: to avoid the costs of financial distress and to maintain financial slack. Graham (2000) reported corroborating evidence that companies do not fully exploit the potential tax benefits of leverage and that they may indeed use a conservative leverage policy to boost future expenditures in capital and acquisitions.
Taking these ideas as a starting point, we test the hypothesis that, in presence of market frictions, firms may anticipate potential financial constraints from creditors in the future by accumulating reserve borrowing power at present. As in Myers (1984) , when firms achieve reserve borrowing power, they are able to issue debt if they need more than the available internal funds to seize positive growth opportunities. To evaluate whether low leverage is the result of a corporate policy rather than a temporary shock, we require firms to be classified as LL for a number of years.
If our hypothesis is correct, the FF dummy should have a positive and significant impact on the capital expenditure of firms. Furthermore, in earlier investment literature, the sensitivity of investments to cash flow was used to assess the degree of capital market imperfections (Fazzari et al., 1988; Hoshi et al., 1991; Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990;  amongst many others). To the extent that investment-cash flow sensitivity, indeed, contains information about financial imperfections (i.e. the accessibility of firms to external markets), then this sensitivity should be negative for FF firms. This is because these companies can raise external funds at time t to finance projects and are less dependent on their internal funds.
However, there is an ongoing debate about the interpretation of this parameter. On the one hand, Fazzari et al., (1988) argued that, for financially constrained firms, investment is more sensitive to cash flow. They argued that the link between cash flow and investment reflects the extent to which firm investment depends on the availability of internal funds (Hubbard, 1998) . The higher the estimated coefficient of cash flow, the stronger the dependence on net worth, which expresses financial constraints. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) provided an opposing perspective. They screened a set of annual reports for a sub-sample of low-dividend payout firms, and concluded that investment-cash flow sensitivity can be higher for unconstrained firms (see also Cleary, 1999; Kaplan and Zingales, 2000; Gamba and Triantis, 2007) . Moreover, Cleary (1999) , Erickson and Whited (2000) , and Alti (2003) presented evidence indicating that measurement problems associated with Tobin's q may affect the sensitivity of investments to the availability of internal funds.
In addition, if our hypothesis is correct, FF firms should show an increase in their abnormal investments around time t. Also, FF firms should sharply increase leverage levels at time t and, accordingly, they should experience an increase in net debt issues. We analyse these patterns by studying the intertemporal descriptive statistics of these variables.
E. Estimation methodology: investment model
Five broad investment model classes can be identified in the literature: the neoclassical model, the sales accelerator model, the Tobin's q model, the Euler-equation model, and the Error Correction Model. Each of these approaches is subject to criticism. However, most testing has been conducted in the context of q-model, in which average Tobin's q is used to control for the investment opportunities available to firms.
For the purpose of comparison with previous work, we test a q-model of investment.
Capital expenditures are regressed on Tobin's q and cash flow. We then augment the model by including our flexibility dummy and interacting it with cash flow to investigate whether FF firms have, indeed, enhanced investment ability and a different sensitivity of investment to cash flow.
As above, we employ the GMM technique in a dynamic framework, similar to that proposed by Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) and Bond et al. (2004) , to control for endogeneity and individual heterogeneity. The estimated model is as follows:
η i is an unobserved firm-specific time-invariant effect, η t is a time-specific firm-invariant effect, and, ν it is a disturbance term assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean equal to zero.
In line with the vast majority of works in this literature, we standardize all variables in the investment model on capital stock (K), which is measured on a replacement cost basis. For the first observation, we assume the replacement cost equals the historic cost of total net fixed assets, adjusted for inflation. For the following observations, we apply a standard perpetual inventory method, as follows:
, where δ is the rate of depreciation, assumed to be 0.08. Investment is defined as the ratio of investments in fixed assets to capital stock (IK); cash flow is defined as the ratio of operating profits before tax, interest, and preference dividends plus depreciation of fixed assets to capital stock (CF); Tobin's q is defined as the ratio the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to capital stock (Q).
II. Data
As we discussed above, following Jensen and Meckling (1976) , the influence of managerial incentives and discretion on capital structure choices has attracted considerable attention. For instance, Friend and Lang (1988) and Mehran (1992) found that managers with discretion tend to choose lower leverage. Consistent with this, Berger et al. (1997) showed that leverage levels are lower when managers do not face pressure from disciplining mechanisms.
Consequently, it is crucial for our study to be able to control for the possibility that leverage conservativism stems from managerial entrenchment rather than financial flexibility.
Thus, we hand-collected a detailed database of ownership structure. In the initial stage, we selected a random sample of around 1,100 listed non-financial firms from Datastream constituent lists. For these firms, we compiled ownership data from the Price Waterhouse Corporate Register (December issue) for the period 1991-2001. We downloaded economic and market data from Datastream. To compute the capital stock on a replacement cost basis, we collected all the economic data from 1969.
To be able to follow companies over time from two different datasets, a considerable effort went into tracking all the name changes (and also defunct companies) in the period. We collected this information mainly from the London Stock Exchange Yearbook, which reports systematic information on name changes, entries removed from the companies section, companies in liquidation, and companies in receivership and in administration. As a further check, we referred to the Companies House website, an online resource that provides various types of information on companies (including name changes).
To run the empirical analysis, we first cleaned the dataset of outliers. We thoroughly inspected the ownership part of the dataset in several directions. For example, we doublechecked that the sum of all the shares collected did not equal more than 100. In cases where they did, we crosschecked the information with other issues of the Hemscott volumes (using either the September edition of the same year or the March edition of the following year), and/or with the London Stock Exchange Yearbook, which also contains some ownership information. When it proved impossible to find coherent information from the different sources of data, we dropped the observation in question from the sample. After running these tests for the ownership side of the dataset, we also checked for outliers in the economic variables, as reported in Datastream. As there is no fixed rule for dealing with outliers, data were trimmed to the 99th percentile, as a general rule of thumb. We then benchmarked the trimmed data with figures reported in other established papers.
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After we addressed the issue of outliers, we excluded firms in the broadcasting sector and public utilities because of the peculiarities in their operational and regulatory conditions.
We also excluded firms with dual class shares, as they violate the "one share one vote" rule.
Further, we dropped missing firm-year observations. Finally, in line with the indications specified by Arellano and Bond (1991) , we dropped firms without at least five consecutive years of observations. This step was necessary for computing asymptotically efficient, secondorder serial correlation tests (Arellano and Bond, 1991) . Further, the risk of survivorship bias may be reduced by requiring a minimum number of consecutive years of data (Yermack, 1996) . This left us with an unbalanced panel of 677 firms and 5660 observations for the leverage model. Brief descriptive statistics are reported in Table III. 7 Particular care was placed in benchmarking the variables in the investment model. As Table 3 shows, our figures are in line with Bond et al. (2004) and Benito and Young (2002) .
[INSERT 
III. Empirical Results
A. Leverage model
We start our analysis by estimating the leverage models, in order to identify the LL firms through the target methodology. For robustness purposes, in Table IV we provide results for the three specifications discussed above. Our GMM estimation reveals that the coefficient of the lagged leverage in all the specifications is positive and significantly different from zero. The reported adjustment coefficient λ, (1 ) α − , is about 0.37, which seems to provide evidence that the dynamic nature of our model is not rejected. Moreover, it indicates that companies take about three years to close the gap with their target. This corroborates our choice of examining the leverage behaviour of firms for three consecutive years. This result is similar to that reported recently by Flannery and Rangan (2006) for U.S. firms.
[
INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE]
Most of the results in all specifications are in line with the predictions in previous literature. The results for Mtbv seem to follow the Pecking Order Theory (POT) more closely than the typical underinvestment hypothesis (Myers, 1977) : firms borrow as much as they need to fund their growth options rather than reduce the amount of debt to limit the agency problems between shareholders and debtholders. We detect a positive and significant impact of size.
Larger firms are less exposed to asymmetric information and expected bankruptcy problems and, consequently, they seem to have better access to external capital markets (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995) . This is in line with the majority of findings in the capital structure literature (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Flannery and Rangan, 2006) . In the same way, firms with larger collateral may be able to afford to have a larger amount of debt, as reported in Rajan and Zingales (1995), Kremp et al. (1999), Frank and Goyal (2003) , and Flannery and Rangan (2006) . Furthermore, profitable firms seem to borrow significantly less, consistent with the POT hypothesis, which predicts that firms prefer to use their internal funds first, and then raise external financing to implement their investments (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Ozkan, 2001; ShyamSunder and Myers, 1999) .
Among the ownership variables, while managerial ownership does not seem to play a relevant role for leverage decisions, blockholding and board composition do. The result for blockholding is consistent with the interpretation that leverage and outside shareholding are alternative agency control mechanisms. Large shareholders have greater incentives to be involved in the control process than smaller ones, because they can more easily bear the high costs of monitoring management behaviour (Stiglitz, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) .
Therefore, when a non-managerial owner holds a larger percentage stake, it reduces the need for other monitoring mechanisms, such as higher debt (Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990) . A similar interpretation may be given for board composition. The results tend to support the view that firms with outside-dominated boards are likely to experience an increase in the monitoring of executives, and therefore a reduction in the agency costs of external financing.
As far as Specification 3 is concerned, the negative and significant coefficient of cash is in line with the transaction costs motive for holding cash. Since raising funds from the external market can be very costly, especially for firms that need prompt liquidity, cash may be used as a buffer against the possibility of having inadequate funds to implement valuable projects. In this sense, cash is a substitute for leverage (Opler et al., 1999) . On the other hand, the positive and significant relation between Maturity and leverage is consistent with the hypothesis that long-term debt is associated with lower liquidity risk and this makes companies more prone to increase their leverage (Johnson, 2003) . In addition, Dividends show a negative sign, although not significant, in line with the argument that dividend policy can play a role in mitigating equity agency costs by facilitating capital market monitoring of the firm's activities and performance (Easterbrook, 1984) .
B. Investment model
We now turn to the investment model estimations. Table V shows the results of the investment model, which follow the calculation of the FF dummies, using the target methodology with the most complete leverage model discussed above (Specification 3). We observe a positive and significant relation between investments and Q, which is consistent with the prediction that growth opportunities play a relevant role in investment decisions. The coefficient for cash flow is always positive and significant, suggesting that the presence of capital market imperfections may result in firms depending, at least partially, on internal funds to invest. This is in line with Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) , Blundell et al. (1992) , and Vogt (1994) .
INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE]
The dummies indicating the FF status are positive and statistically significant across all models, indicating that these companies seem to invest in capital expenditures significantly more than the others after a period of conservative leverage (FF and FFpct, Models A through D).
Further, we find that the investment sensitivity to cash flow, represented by the interaction terms between FF dummies and cash flow, is always negative. This result might imply that FF companies are less exposed to capital market imperfections and, thus, their ability to invest is at least no more jeopardized by asymmetric and agency costs problems than the other firms. The impact of the FF status dummy is also economically sizeable. Indeed, ceteris paribus, taking a company with an average cash flow (approximately 0.32 according to Figure 1 presents the graphs describing firms' choices over time. We start by defining t=0
C. Firm behaviour over time
as the time when FF firms are assigned a value of 1. Then, we analyze their behaviour in terms of both investment and financial decisions before and after that time-from t-2 to t+2. We differentiate FF firms from two other types. NFF companies, those that are never classified as FF represent our control group. We also separate AFF companies, those that never change their LL status throughout the sample period.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Prior to t, FF firms appear to be investing less than the other two groups (Figure 1a) .
Nonetheless, between t-1 and t, they appear to experience an important and sudden increase in their investments, in line with previous econometric results. AFF and NFF, on the contrary, show a steady and slightly decreasing level of investment, respectively. This may support the hypothesis that FF firms have used their accumulated borrowing capacity to make more investments.
To further investigate this argument, we analyze abnormal investments in Figure 1b .
These are capital expenditures that are larger in value than what appears to be the norm in the firm's life (Mayer and Sussman, 2004) . To identify these spikes, we proceed as follows. First, we identify investments over a period of three years of data. We calculate the average value of investments only in the extreme years, excluding the central one (i.e., (I t-1 + I t+1 )/2). This calculation represents the norm investment. Then, we define an investment as abnormal if its value in the central year (t) is at least twice the average of the two extremes. 10 Once these spikes have been identified, we plot their average value for the three groups of firms. Figure 1b indicates that around t, FF firms experience a significant increase in their abnormal investments, at a much larger magnitude than other companies.
Figures 1c and 1d shed more light on how firms finance these investments. They sharply increase their total borrowing between t-1 and t+2 (Figure 1c) , which corresponds to a decline in the gap between actual and predicted leverage (Figure 1d) . From time t, FF firms are much closer to their target, as the values for the deviations are close to zero. Figure 1e confirms this trend, as FF firms appear to markedly increase new net debt issues between t-1 and t, which is what leads to the closure of the deviation from target leverage. This further corroborates our initial hypothesis that, after a period of conservative borrowing, FF firms are more able to exploit the external markets.
These are very significant pieces of evidence, which strongly corroborate our starting hypothesis that, at least some companies, sacrifice borrowing today and use this spare debt capacity to be able to afford more (possibly better) investment tomorrow. A word of caution is in order here. One possible counterargument is that these figures merely tell a story of lack of growth options. In other words, FF firms simply have low growth opportunities before t, and that is why they are investing and borrowing less. However, inspection of the data reveals that FF companies have average growth options of 1.49, as measured by Mtbv, while NFF companies have 1.41. Also, average Mtbv for FF firms is 1.46, 1.49 and 1.49, between t-2 and t. This may confute the view that these firms are investing less (i.e. at t-2) because they have fewer opportunities for investment. Furthermore, in the leverage model which generates LL (and FF) we are controlling for growth options (Mtbv). Therefore, leverage wise these firms appear to behave in a more conservative way than their growth options (ceteris paribus) would predict, as shown in Figure 1d .
Therefore, it does not appear that FF firms are borrowing and investing less before t because of lack of growth options. Rather, this evidence seems to strongly support our hypothesis that FF firms make large capital expenditures after having reinforced their capacity to raise external financing. In particular, the fact that around t, FF firms increase their abnormal investments strengthens our argument that through a conservative leverage policy they were getting themselves ready to seize very large growth options. This complements the evidence reported by Lemmon and Zender (2002) in their test on the determinants of capital structure. 10 The same exercise was performed using five rather than three years and delivers similar conclusions.
They found that firms stockpile debt capacity by adding internal equity when moderate asset growth can be sufficiently funded by retained earnings.
A further argument that may confute ours is that firms restrain their borrowing but use equity issues to invest. For instance, Mayer and Sussman (2004) and Tsyplakov (2006) issues. Figure 1f shows that firms do not appear to use new equity issues to finance the new investments. Rather, during the sample period, all firms seem to experience share repurchases. This trend is in line with recent evidence on the UK market by Oswald and Young (2004) .
To summarize, our results lend strong empirical support to the survey evidence on capital structure. A financial flexibility strategy actually appears to improve the ability of firms to invest in and "pursue new projects when they come along" (Graham and Harvey, 2001 ). Firms show a marked increase in capital expenditures and, more particularly, in abnormal ones. They appear to finance these with new issues of debt that take them closer to their target leverage.
D. Robustness Checks
Investment results using different leverage models
To investigate whether the investment results depend on the leverage model of choice, we re-run all the analysis with more parsimonious leverage models (Specifications 1 and 2 above), and a more complete model (Specification 4), that also includes taxes (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006) , non-debt tax shield (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Fama and French, 2002) , R&D expenditures (Titman and Wessel, 1988; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Flannery and Rangan, 2006) and capital expenditures (Graham, 2000) .
Also, we test these specifications on a longer time series (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) to assess the dependence of our results from the choice of the time series. The results reported in Table VI show that the FF dummies are always significant and positive, irrespective of the leverage specification, and the interaction with cash flow is always negative. This shows that our results
are not driven by a particular choice of model. 11 Moreover, the fact that the results are stable across such a wide variety of different leverage models lends support to our view that the financial flexibility factor is embodied in the deviation from target leverage.
11 The intertemporal descriptive analysis reveals qualitatively similar figures to those described above. 
Investment results using the percentile methodology
In a more radical test, we replicate our analysis defining LL firms based on the statistical distribution of observed leverage ratios. If our hypothesis is correct, we would expect to find qualitatively consistent results. If this is the case, then we would be confident that the choice of leverage specification is not driving the results.
We follow an approach similar to Minton and Wruck (2001) and require firms to be in the bottom three deciles of the leverage distribution for at least three consecutive years prior to the investment decision, in order to assign the FF status. As such, if firm A is classified as lowleverage for 1991, 1992, and 1993, it is assigned a value of 1 in 1994 to capture its flexible status in the previous three years (FF). When we follow this methodology, a lower number of companies are classified as FF (176), there are 385 NFF firms and there are 52 that are always classified as low-leverage (AFF). Despite these differences, our calculations confirm that firms adopt this strategy only temporarily, being classified as FF for an average (median) of 3.02 (3) consecutive periods. This figure is larger than the average (median) of 2.64 (2) obtained using the target method. As we discussed above, this may be because the former is stricter in assessing the evolution of firm's leverage in time, which makes it more difficult for firms to change status.
Consistent with our previous results, the robustness tests reported in Table VII confirm that the flexibility dummy is always significant and positive, indicating an increased ability to invest. The interaction with cash flow is statistically insignificant, though still negative, which may confirm that financing frictions do not particularly affect firms' ability to invest.
[INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE]
Investment results using alternative investment models
Estimating q-models of investment has its own set of problems. A potentially serious issue is that Tobin's q will only include future expectations if the conditions indicated by Hayashi (1982) to approximate marginal q with average q hold. In practice, these conditions may not be fulfilled. For instance, in the presence of a stock market bubble, Tobin's q would not capture all relevant information about the expected future profitability of current investment.
Therefore, a positive estimated cash flow coefficient would represent the expectations not captured by Tobin's q rather than the presence of financing frictions (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001 
E. Alternative Interpretation of Results
Financial flexibility or financial constraint?
It could be argued that firms may be characterized by low leverage not as a result of a policy, but rather as a consequence of the difficulty of raising more external debt. In other words, leverage conservativism may be viewed as a proxy for lower accessibility to external capital (John, 1993) . Under this perspective, LL would express a financially constrained rather than a financially flexible status, because these firms are incapable of raising more capital on the external market. However, it would be reasonable to expect that if FF firms are financially constrained, their ability to invest would be hampered, which is in sharp contrast with our results.
Further, we can advance an argument against this view based on the analysis of the coefficients of cash flow between sub-samples. Indeed, we persistently report negative interaction terms between cash flow and the FF dummy. This holds even when we use the Euler equation rather than the q-model and supports the view that FF firms are, at least, no more constrained than the other companies in the sample.
However, the typical approach adopted in the investment literature has been to split firms between constrained and unconstrained and compare the estimated coefficients of cash flow.
Therefore, we replicate the exercise by splitting the sample between FF and NFF firms, and further test whether investment cash flow sensitivities differ between the two groups. If FF is an expression of financial constraints rather than flexibility, the coefficient for cash flow should be larger in magnitude, positive, and statistically significant for FF firms. In contrast, if FF is an expression of flexibility, a lower, and possibly insignificant, coefficient for cash flow should be retrieved, suggesting a lower degree of dependence on the availability of internal funds to invest. FF companies are at least no more exposed to capital market imperfections than those that never adopt a LL policy for at least three consecutive years. This substantiates our argument that a conservative leverage policy does not necessarily imply that these firms systematically experience difficulties in raising funds from the external markets.
[ INSERT TABLE IX ABOUT HERE] Further, to the extent that dividends or size are meaningful proxies for financial constraints (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988) , we would expect FF companies to report lower dividend payments than NFF firms, if (low) leverage is a proxy of financial constraints. However, data inspection shows that FF firms pay, on average, more dividends than NFF ones, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (see Table X ). A similar argument could be made regarding firm size. Indeed, FF companies appear to be larger than NFF firms and, consequently, they may be expected to suffer less from, for instance, asymmetric information problems.
Moreover, some authors have argued that financially constrained firms are expected to have higher incentives to hold large cash reserves (Fazzari et al., 1996; Kim et al., 1998; Hovakimian and Titman, 2006) . Therefore, if FF companies are financially constrained, they would report more internal funds. This does not appear to be our case either. According to the figures reported in Table X , FF firms do not appear to be cash rich when compared to the other sub-samples, and the difference in cash holding is not even statistically significant. This would make it unlikely that these firms are following a conservative leverage policy because they are having difficulty raising money in the external market.
INSERT TABLE X ABOUT HERE]
Also, unconstrained firms have better access to all financial markets and, in particular, to long-term financing, which usually requires a larger amount of collateral (Titman and Wessel, 1988) . A larger fraction of long term debt may signal how companies can easily obtain funds from external markets. In our context, Table X shows that FF firms have significantly more longterm debt than NFF companies, suggesting that this status is not a proxy for financial constraints.
An alternative approach would be represented by measures of bankruptcy risk. When we calculate the z-score, following Altman (1968) , we find that our FF firms are indeed less likely to file for bankruptcy, and the difference compared to NFF firms is statistically significant at any conventional level. As a further robustness test, we collect the variable "quiscore," a measure of bankruptcy risk, from the Amadeus Database. Similarly to the z-score, high quiscore values indicate lower bankruptcy risk. Again, FF firms feature a higher value than NFF firms, and the difference is statistically significant. As a final step, we collect debt rating information. 14 As Faulkender and Petersen (2006) documented in the U.S., very few UK companies have any debt rating. However, the figures document that 16 companies classified as FF have a debt rating, as do 11 NFF ones; further, the average rating for FF firms is 78.12, versus 70 for NFF firms, and the difference is again statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
These further tests corroborate our argument that FF firms are not more exposed to market imperfections than others and that LL does not appear to proxy for financial constraints.
Financial flexibility or managerial entrenchment?
The relation between leverage and the likelihood of expropriation by managers depends on whether debt constrains or facilitates this expropriation. On the one hand, some authors argue that managers prefer to keep debt ratios low to reduce risk and protect their undiversified human capital (Fama, 1980) or to alleviate the pressure that comes with interest payment commitments (e.g., Jensen, 1986) . On the other hand, according to Harris and Raviv (1990) and Stulz (1988) , managers may prefer higher leverage in order to inflate their voting power and reduce the possibility of a takeover. Furthermore, according to Leland and Pyle's (1977) signalling hypothesis, managers may choose higher leverage to convince investors of their ability to generate sufficient earnings to repay their debt.
Therefore, it is not necessarily unambiguous to conclude that a low-leverage policy may be driven by the presence of managerial entrenchment issues inside the firm. Nonetheless, this possibility cannot be ruled out a priori. For this reason, as discussed above we explicitly control for ownership and governance characteristics in the leverage regressions in order to control for this issue.
Also, to the extent that entrenched managers prefer a suboptimal level of leverage, we would expect a shift in those variables that represent conflicts between managers and shareholders that corresponds to the dramatic change detected in the amount of debt held by FF firms between t-2 and t. In other words we would expect to observe a structural break in executive ownership, blockholding, and/or board composition to explain the shift in leverage policy we detect. We plot these variables for FF, NFF, and AFF firms (2a, 2b and 2c) in Figure   2 , which shows no significant "break." Overall, this evidence does not appear to be consistent 14 We thank Francesco Cerlienco from Reuters for kindly providing this data.
with the view that low leverage is driven by managerial entrenchment issues and corroborates our hypothesis that it is linked instead to a desire to maintain a degree of financial flexibility.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
IV. Conclusions
In this paper we study the interaction between financial flexibility and investment ability. Our argument, based on the ideas of Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Myers (1984) , maintains that, in presence of financial constraints, firms that anticipate valuable growth options in the future respond by accumulating reserves of borrowing power. Through a conservative leverage policy undertaken over a number of years, companies gain a degree of financial flexibility that allows them to have better access to the external market at time t, and to raise funds to supplement their internal funds, enabling them to invest more.
The results of our empirical tests are consistent with the predictions. We report strong evidence of significant links between financing and investment decisions. Our findings indicate that, after a period of low leverage, financially flexible firms are able to invest significantly more in capital expenditures. We show that the impact of the flexibility factor is sizeable in economic
terms. An average firm is able to increase its investment by more than 50 percent. This is an important result, which provides a rationale for many firms' conservative leverage behavior (Graham, 2000; Minton and Wruck, 2001; Almeida et al., 2006) . Further, firms classified as financially flexible appear to be less exposed to financial constraints, as indicated by the lower estimated coefficient of cash flow in the investment equation.
Our intertemporal investigation of firm behaviour corroborates these results. After a period of three years of leverage conservativism, financially flexible firms significantly increase their capital expenditures with respect to the previous years. Most notably, we identify a sharp increase in abnormal investments. Our results indicate that firms finance this investment with positive net debt issues through which they close the gap with their target leverage.
We perform numerous robustness checks in several directions. The results are robust to:
1) several different specifications of the leverage model; 2) the use of different time periods; 3) a classification method for LL firms that does not entail the estimation of any leverage model; and 4) different specifications for the investment model.
Finally, we test our results against several alternative hypotheses that may confute our original argument. However, we fail to find any evidence that the low-leverage strategy is driven by lack of growth options, financial constraints, or managerial entrenchment.
Table I. Example of firm classification method
This table provides a brief example, showing how the FF dummy was generated. Deviation represents the difference between predicted and actual leverage. Because the leverage model is estimated in first difference, the first observation is "lost" (denoted as N/A for 1991 in the third column). Moreover, since we require at least three consecutive observations in which firms are recorded as low-leverage to assign the financial flexibility status, the first available observation to meaningfully classify FF firms in the last column is the fourth one (corresponding to the 1995 observation in the example). Therefore, the observations corresponding to 1992, 1993, and 1994 are denoted as "N/A" as well.
Firm id Year Deviation Low-Leverage Financially Flexible
AAA 1991 N/A N/A N/A AAA 1992 < 1 N/A AAA 1993 < 1 N/A AAA 1994 < 1 N/A AAA 1995 > 0 1 AAA 1996 > 0 0 AAA 1997 < 1 0 AAA 1998 < 1 0 AAA 1999 < 1 0 AAA 2000 < 1 1 AAA 2001 < 1 1
Table II. Classification of firms
This table reports the classification of firms based on the target methodology. We compare the fitted values from the leverage regression with the actual values for each firm year. LL firms are those that have a negative deviation between actual and predicted leverage. FF stands for Financially Flexible. It is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when we observe at least three consecutive periods in which the firm is classified as LL. NFF stands for Never Financially Flexible and indicates a company that never shows a FF status over the estimation period. AFF stands for Always Financially Flexible and denotes those firms that show a low-leverage status for the entire estimation period.
FF NFF AFF Total
Target method 270 277 66 613
Table III. Descriptive statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in our study. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets; Mtbv is the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices; Collateral is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; Profitability is the ratio of the earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation (EBITD) to total assets; Cash is the ratio of total cash and equivalents to total assets; Maturity is the ratio of loans repayable after one year to total debt; Dividends is the ratio of ordinary dividends net of Advance Corporation Tax to total assets; Managerial Ownership is the sum of ordinary shareholdings held by executive directors (%); Blockholding is the sum of the non-managerial shareholdings above three percent; Board Composition is the proportion of non-executives to total number of directors; IK is the ratio of investment to capital stock; CFK is the ratio of cash flow to capital stock; Q is the ratio of market value of assets to capital stock. This table presents GMM-SYS estimations that we use to predict leverage choices. The dependent variable is Lev defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets; Mtbv is the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices; Collateral is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; Profitability is the ratio of the earnings before interest, tax and depreciation (EBITD) to total assets; Managerial Ownership is the sum of ordinary shareholdings held by executive directors (%); Blockholding is the sum of the external (non-managerial) shareholdings above three percent; Board Composition is the proportion of non-executives to total number of directors; Cash is the ratio of total cash and equivalents to total assets; Maturity is the ratio of loans repayable after one year to total debt; Dividends is the ratio of ordinary dividends net of Advance Corporation Tax to total assets. We include time dummies in all estimations and conduct all estimations using the GMM-SYS. For the first difference equations, levels dated [t-2, t-5] 
Figure 1. Firm behaviour in time
These figures present an analysis of firms' choices over time based on the leverage status dummies derived from Specification 3. Firms are divided between FF (Financially Flexible), NFF (never classified as FF) and AFF (those which always report a lower than target leverage). The central observation t=0 corresponds to the moment at which FF firms are assigned a value of 1. We then conduct the analyses of the trends for each firm characteristic before and after this moment (from t-2 to t+2). IK is the ratio of investment to capital stock; Abnormal Investment is defined over a pattern of three years of investment data. The average value of investments is calculated in the extreme years. Thus, there is a spike in this pattern only if the investment value in the central year is at least twice the average of the extremes; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; Deviation is the difference between the actual and predicted level of leverage for each firm; Net Debt Issued is the ratio of net debt issued in each year to total assets; Net Equity Issued is the ratio of net equity issued in each year to total assets. This table shows the GMM results for the Euler equation with the leverage status dummies computed from the estimation of the "complete" leverage model (Specification 3). The dependent variable is IK defined as the ratio of investment to capital stock; CFK is the ratio of cash flow to capital stock; Q is the ratio of market value of assets to capital stock; S is the ratio of total sales to capital stock; D is the ratio of total debt to capital stock; FF is a dummy equal to 1 if a company is identified as low-leverage (LL) for the three consecutive years before the analyzed investment decision and 0 otherwise; FFpct is a dummy equal to 1 if a company has a negative deviation from its target larger than at least 25 percent of all undershooting firms for the three consecutive years before the analyzed investment decisions and 0 otherwise. We include time dummies in all estimations and conduct all estimations using the GMM-DIFF. This table reports t tests on the equality of means of some key financial variables between different groups of firms. FF refers to Financially Flexible firms. It is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when we observe at least three consecutive periods in which the firm is classified as LL prior to the investment decision; NFF stands for Never Financially Flexible, those firms that never show a FF status over the entire estimation period; AFF stands for Always Financially Flexible, those firms with a low-leverage status for the entire estimation period. Dividends is the ratio of ordinary dividends net of Advance Corporation Tax to total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices; Cash is the ratio of total cash and equivalents to total assets; Debt Maturity is the ratio of loans repayable after one year to total debt; Z-Score is defined following Altman (1968) (0.012*(current assets -current debt)/total assets + 0.014*retained earnings/total assets + 0.033*earnings before interest and taxes/total assets + 0.006*equity/total debt + 0.010*sales/total assets; Quiscore is a variable developed and maintained by CRIF Decision Solutions Limited. Its computation takes into account a range of factors. These include the presence of any adverse documents appearing against the company on the public file and the timeliness of getting the accounts filed. In addition, we factor the underlying economic conditions into the equation. However, the most important factors relate to the financial performance of the company as evidenced by their balance sheet and profit and loss account. In determining a score, we perform a number of separate calculations using various combinations of the key financial items -these include turnover, pre-tax profit, working capital, intangibles, cash and bank deposits, creditors, bank loans and overdrafts, current assets, current liabilities, net assets, fixed assets, share capital, reserves, and shareholders funds. The score ranges from 0 to 100, where larger figures represent lower bankruptcy risk. Debt Rating data were kindly provided by Reuters. The figures represent the number of firms that have been rated at some point in time throughout the sample period and we report the average rating in parentheses. The rating is a numeric variable that assumes a value of 100 for AAA firms, 10 for CCC or below, and 0 for unrated firms. Investment grade is defined from the value of 70 and above (S&P rating of BBB or higher). 
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Figure 2. Financial Flexibility or Managerial Entrenchment?
These figures present an analysis of firms' ownership and governance structure over time based on the leverage status dummies derived from Specification 3. Firms are divided between FF (Financially Flexible), NFF (never classified as FF) and AFF (those which always report a lower than target leverage). The central observation t=0 corresponds to the moment at which FF firms are assigned a value of 1. We then conduct the analysis of the trends for each firm characteristic before and after this moment (from t-2 to t+2). Executive Ownership is the percentage ordinary shareholdings by executive directors. Blockholding is the percentage of all external shareholdings above three percent. Board Composition is the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. 
